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Many violent relationships are characterized by a high degree of cyclicality: women who are the victims
of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times. To explain this we develop a model of
time inconsistent preferences in the context of domestic violence. This time inconsistency generates
a demand for commitment. We present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display
time inconsistent preferences by examining their demand for commitment devices. We find that "no-drop"
policies -- which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a
desire to drop the charges -- result in an increase in reporting. No-drop policies also result in a decrease
in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships
















Everyday roughly 14 thousand women in the US are battered and 4 are killed by 
their intimate partners.  An interesting and often puzzling aspect of violent relationships 
is its cyclical nature (Walker, 1979; Strube, 1988). Battered women who leave and seek 
the help of authorities in pressing criminal charges against their partners often return to 
the abuser and ask the authorities to drop the charges, despite the high probability of 
future victimization. The well-documented fact that women repeatedly change their mind 
after leaving or reporting the batterer suggests that the idea of a rational agent with stable 
preferences weighing the benefits and costs of reporting abuse and leaving may not be an 
appropriate framework for studying domestic violence. Rather, a framework in which 
preferences change with battering may be more appropriate.  
In this paper we propose a model of time inconsistent preferences to study 
domestic violence.  The victim’s preferences change with time from the battering 
incident.  That is, right after a battering incident, while in shock and fear, a woman’s 
valuation of the relationship is low but increases as time passes.  This is consistent with 
empirical evidence on how emotional states affect the desirability of different goods or 
actions (see Loewenstein, 1996; Read and van Leeuwen, 1998; Loewenstein et al, 2001; 
Gilbert et al. 2002; Wilson and Gilbert 2003). This model can explain how a woman 
might leave her partner after a battering incident with the intention of not returning, but 
after some time, her emotional attachment resurfaces and she returns.  
In principle, models with changing but time consistent preferences (ie: traditional 
models of rational addiction or the cue theory of consumption) can also explain cyclical   3
behavior.
2  However, the key difference between time consistent and inconsistent agents 
is that the latter, if aware, will try to discipline their future behavior by committing 
themselves to a certain future action. In the case of smoking, for example, a person may 
wish to commit him or herself to quitting and therefore may welcome devices such as 
higher taxes (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001; Gruber and Mullanaithan, 2002).  In the case of 
domestic violence, a woman may want to commit herself not to return to the batterer and 
thus welcome policies that commit her to doing so.  
In this paper we study the demand for such a commitment device: “no-drop” 
policy of prosecution.  This policy stipulates that once a woman brings charges against a 
batterer, the prosecution will continue regardless of her stated wishes to drop the charges.  
In this way, no-drop policies offer a commitment device for women who want to 
terminate a violent relationship but fear that their intentions may change. 
We develop a model of time inconsistent preferences in the context of violent 
relationships that yields two predictions.  First, if women are sufficiently time 
inconsistent, no-drop policies will increase reporting of battering incidents.  That is, 
women will be more likely to report violent partners when they are offered a device that 
will enable them to commit to prosecuting them.  Second, no-drop policies will reduce 
the number of men murdered by intimates as women in violent relationships will 
substitute an expensive private commitment device (murder of the batterer) for a cheaper 
public commitment device provided by the no-drop policy.  
We follow this with empirical estimation of the impact of no drop policies on 
reporting and intentional intimate partner homicide. The results provide evidence in favor 
                                                 
2 For consumption cycles in rational addiction models see Ryder and Heal (1973), Becker and Murphy 
(1988), Dockner and Feichtinger (1993) and Palacios-Huerta (2003). For the cue theory of consumption, 
which can also provide cycles, see Laibson (2001).   4
of our theory of time inconsistent preferences in battering relationships. First, we find 
that no-drop policies lead to a 14-18 percent increase in reporting, as measured by the 
number of men arrested for domestic violence. This is consistent with the model’s 
prediction that women in battering relationships demand commitment devices if they are 
sufficiently time inconsistent.  We also find that no-drop policies led to a 15-22 percent 
decline in the number of men intentionally murdered by intimates, a large fraction of 
whom have documented histories of battering. Our finding that no-drop policies reduce 
the number of men murdered by intimates provides evidence that battered women will 
move away from an extreme type of commitment device –murder– when a less costly one 
is offered in the form of no-drop prosecution. Finally, we find no evidence that no drop 
policies lead to a reduction in domestic violence as measured by the number of women 
killed by intimate partners or the number of women admitted to the hospital for an 
assault.  This suggests that the reduction in the number of men being murdered by 
intimates can not be explained by a reduction in the number of violent relationships due 
to no-drop policies.  Nor do we believe that the reduction can be due to underlying 
changes in the type or composition of violent relationships as the effect appears to be 
immediate.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we explain the cyclical nature of 
battering relationships in the context of time inconsistent preferences. Though an 
economist (Mill, 1869) was one of the first to address the issue of domestic violence, 
modern economic literature on the subject is somewhat limited. The recent literature has 
focused on explaining violence under the assumption of time consistent rational agents   5
and consists of a handful of studies.
3  The main distinction between our work and 
previous work is our assumption of time inconsistent agents.   
There exists an extensive literature on time inconsistency of time-preferences that 
can trace its roots to Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968). Yet most of the 
literature has focused on present biased preferences as in Ainslie (1991), Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1992), Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) among others. Our 
model differs in that the time inconsistency of preference is not in regards to discounting 
but in regards to the valuation of possible choices in a given period.   
Our second contribution is that we provide new empirical evidence consistent 
with the theory of time inconsistent preferences, adding to the growing non-experimental 
empirical evidence of time inconsistency and the demand for commitments, see 
Angeletos et al. (2001), Madrian and Shea (2001), Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) and 
Della Vigna and Malmendier (2003). 
The fact that the introduction of no-drop policies reduces the number of men 
murdered by intimates has interesting implications outside domestic violence. It implies 
that when agents are time inconsistent, the analysis of policies that incorporate a 
commitment element should consider the effect on the demand for alternative 
                                                 
3 Tauchen et al (1991) provide a non-cooperative model of families that incorporates the 
possibility of violence and study the impact of future changes in male and female incomes among 125 
women in a battered women’s shelter in Santa Barbara. Aizer (2006) estimates the impact of the shrinking 
male-female wage gap on violence against women and the impact of domestic violence on birth outcomes. 
Regarding the effect of policies, Tauchen and Witte (1995) study the impact of different arrest policies on 
future violence. Dee (2003) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) estimate the impact of unilateral divorces 
laws on intimate partner homicide and suicide. Iyengar (2007) estimates the impact of mandatory arrests on 
intimate partner homicide. Finally, Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1996) provide a signaling model of leaving a 
violent relationship and Pollak (2002) presents a model of intergenerational transmission of domestic 
violence.  
   6
commitment devices. In this case, a public policy that offers a cheap commitment device 
results in a decrease in the demand for a costly private commitment device.  
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows.  In section 2 we provide background 
information on the prevalence and costs of domestic violence in the US.  In section 3 we 
describe the cyclical nature of battering.  In section 4 we describe no-drop policies and 
present anecdotal evidence in favor of the idea of time inconsistent preferences. In 
section 5 we present a model of domestic violence with time inconsistent preferences and 
study the effect of no-drop policies on violence and reporting.  In section 6 we present 
our empirical estimates of the impact of no drop policies on domestic violence, reporting 
(as measured by arrest rates) and intimate partner homicide.   
 
2. The problem of battering 
Domestic violence is a problem of considerable social importance in the US given 
its prevalence and the severity of its impact on the health and well-being of those 
affected.  In 2001, women in the US reported 590 thousand incidents of rape, sexual and 
other assault at the hands of intimate partners and on average 4 women are killed each 
day by a partner. Though the number of reported assaults is high – it is likely an 
underestimate.  Survey data suggest that only one half to one fifth of such assaults are 
reported to the police.
4  Data gathered through personal surveys and medical professional 
assessments suggest that between 8 and 14 percent of women have been assaulted in the 
past year by an intimate, with lifetime prevalence estimated at 25 - 30 percent (See Jones 
et al. (1999).  For women, intimate violence accounts for 33 percent of all homicides.  
                                                 
4 Bureau of Justice Statistics (1998); 2002 Minnesota crime survey; Tjaden and Thoennes (2000b), data are 
from the NCVS – National Criminal Victimization Survey.    7
According to a report issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2002, 
“intimate partner violence occurs in all countries, irrespective of social, economic, 
religious or cultural group.”  Findings from population-based surveys of women from 35 
countries around the world suggest that between 10 and 69 percent of women have been 
physically assaulted by an intimate male partner at some point in their lives, with 3 to 27 
percent assaulted in the last year. 
The costs associated with domestic violence are significant.  Women who are 
victims of domestic violence suffer directly both physically and emotionally from the 
injury itself.  Reported injuries range from scratches, bruises and welts to lacerations, 
broken bones and head or spinal cord injuries (Tjaden and Thoennes , 2000a). One third 
of women injured by an intimate required medical attention and of those, 26 percent were 
hospitalized overnight for their injuries.  The CDC estimates that the costs associated 
with domestic violence attributed to medical care service use amount to roughly 4 billion 
annually.
5  
Domestic violence also diminishes a woman’s ability to work outside the home.  
The CDC estimates that in 1995, victims of physical assault lost on average 7.2 days of 
work outside the home as a direct result of their injuries and 8.4 days of household work, 
yielding total annual costs in terms of lost earnings in excess of $.7 billion.
6 Additional 
studies have found that women who had been victims of domestic violence were more 
                                                 
5 Costs include both mental health and medical care costs with the latter consisting of physician visits, 
physical therapy, outpatient visits, inpatient care and emergency department visits.  The costs were 
calculated using cost data from the MEPS and utilization data from the NSVAW. See CDC (2003). 
6 Costs were calculated by multiplying the estimated number of lost days by age group by the average 
earnings of women in that age group and summing over all age groups.  The costs reflect 1995 earnings and 
incidence rates.    8
likely to use welfare, have longer unemployment spells, and experience higher job 
turnover than those who had not (Lloyd and Taluc, 1999;  Browne et al., 1999). 
The children of women abused by their partners also suffer. Parker et al. (1994) 
study 1200 births to women in Boston and find that women who were the victims of 
intimate violence were at significant risk for low-birthweight, infections and anemia, 
controlling for a host of other potential confounders. Aizer (2006) employs instrumental 
variable methods to estimate the impact of violence against women on birth outcomes 
and finds that victimization while pregnant significantly increases the likelihood of a low 
birth weight birth. In addition, children who witness violence against their mothers 
(between 50 and 64 percent of all women report that their children routinely witnessed 
the abuse) are at increased risk for developmental problems including high levels of 
anxiety and depression, low self-esteem, and poor school performance - similar to those 
who have themselves been abused (WHO, 2002). 
 
3. The cyclical nature of violent relationships 
Despite the high costs of domestic violence in terms of physical and emotional 
injury, lost days of work and the negative impact on their children, many victims refuse 
to leave their batters or seek the help of authorities. Among the reasons cited by battered 
women for why they remain are: love of their partners, financial dependence, lack of 
support by third parties and fear for their safety or the safety of their children (WHO, 
2002; Sagot, 2000; Strube, 1988 and references therein).   In a study of victims of 
domestic violence in Omaha, Nebraska, nearly 60 percent of women stated that one of the 
reasons they remain in relationships is their love for their abusers (Dunford et al, 1990).   9
The decision to leave also depends on the severity and frequency of the beatings 
(Gelles,1976; Strube, 1988).  Reasons for not reporting abuse to the authorities include 
considering the incident a private matter, not wanting the police or courts involved, fear 
of perpetrator, wanting to protect the perpetrator or the relationship and believing that the 
police could or would not do anything (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998; Tjaden and 
Thoennes, 2000). While these reasons are consistent with the idea of rational agents 
weighing the benefits and costs of leaving or reporting, a more complex picture appears 
once we consider the dynamics of battering. 
While some women refuse to leave their batterers, perhaps just as common are 
women who leave their batterers multiple times only to return despite the high probability 
of future victimization.  Past studies have found that between 25% and 75% of women 
seeking help in shelters return to their partners shortly after leaving the shelter.
7  Studies 
by psychologists provide additional evidence of this cyclical pattern (see Walker, 1979). 
Reasons provided for returning include: a belief that the batterer wants to change, 
emotional attachment, economic needs, pressure from others and fear. Interestingly, 
women who seek help in shelters underestimate their probability of returning to the 
abuser (Griffing et al., 2002).  Evidence suggests that after leaving, women may 
experience an increased emotional attachment to their batterers, making them more likely 
to return (Dutton, 1995; Griffing et al., 2002). Over time women seem to learn the 
importance of emotional attachment: Griffing et al (2002) find that women with past 
                                                 
7 See Strube (1988). When women do leave, they typically do so only after years of abuse. Tjaden and 
Thoennes (2000) found that victims of physical assault suffered an average of 4.5 years of victimization by 
the same partner, with 26.6% of the women suffering more than 5 years. On average, women suffer 7 
assaults at the hands of the same partner.   10
experience of leaving and returning assign more importance to emotional attachment as a 
reason to return.
8 
Just as women leave and return to their batterers, it is also common for women who 
report their partners to the authorities to change their mind afterwards, dropping the 
charges and returning to their partners, only to be battered again in the future. Studies in 
the 1970s and 1980s found that among women whose husbands had been arrested for 
assault against them, between 50 and 90 percent requested that the charges be dropped by 
the prosecutor, despite evidence that women who drop charges are four times more likely 
to suffer future violence than those who do not.
9 
The well-documented fact that many women change their minds after leaving or 
reporting their partners suggests that the idea of a rational agent with stable preferences 
weighing the benefits and costs of leaving or reporting may not be appropriate. We 
believe that the dynamics of battering indicate that women’s preferences change as time 
from the battering incident elapses. Right after the incident, the costs of remaining in the 
relationship are clear to the woman and her valuation of the relationship will be low. As 
time passes her emotional attachment to the batterer may reappear as fear is replaced by 
other feelings such as loneliness. Our assumption that women value the relationship less 
when fearful is consistent with psychological evidence on how emotional states affect the 
desirability of different goods or actions (see Loewenstein 1996; Read and van Leeuwen, 
1998; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Gilbert et al., 2002; Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). We 
propose to model women in battering relationships as having time inconsistent 
preferences.  
                                                 
8 They did not find differences across women in the other reasons for returning. 
9 See Parnas (1970), Field and Field (1973), Bannon (1975), Ford (1983) and Ford and Regoli (1992).    11
The cyclical character of battering relationships could be explained without relying 
upon changing preferences. Women could leave and return in response to changes in the 
likelihood of violence. Women might also leave and report as a tool to improve their 
bargaining position in the relationship without intending to end the relationship.
10 
However, neither can explain the large number of women who initially report that they 
do want to end the relationship but finally return to their batterers. A third explanation 
may be that women have limited information about their outside opportunities and may 
return after they obtain better information. However, this is not completely consistent 
with the fact that battered women in shelters highly underestimate the likelihood of 
returning. Finally, cyclical behavior can in principle be explained with changing but time 
consistent preferences as in the rational theory of addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988; 
Dockner and Feichtinger 1993; and Palacios-Huerta 2003) and the cue theory of 
consumption (Laibson, 1997). 
A key difference between these alternative explanations of the cyclical nature of 
battering relationships and our theory of time inconsistent preferences revolves around 
the demand for commitment devices. With time inconsistent preferences there is a 
tension between the intentions of a woman right after a battering incident and the same 
woman some time after. If a woman knows that her intentions will change in the future 
and she dislikes the decision that she will make in the future, she may desire to commit 
herself to a course of action now. In contrast, these alternative explanations do not 
generate a demand for commitment. In the rest of the paper we provide both anecdotal 
and quantitative evidence that is consistent with a model in which battered women do 
                                                 
10 Farmer and Tiefenthaler  (1996) develop a model to explain that women might leave their abusive 
partners to signal that they are willing and able to end a violent relationship.  However, this model explains 
less well the extreme cyclicality that is observed with women leaving and returning multiple times.    12
demand commitment devices by examining the effect of a policy that commits women to 
prosecute their batterer. This no-drop policy is described in the next section.  
 
4. No-Drop policies 
Over the past 25 years, local prosecutors and legislators have adopted a series of 
legal innovations with the objective of increasing prosecution of domestic violence.  One 
of the most common and controversial is a “no-drop” policy which compels the 
prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the 
charges and ceases to cooperate with the prosecution.  In a survey of 50 of the largest US 
cities, in 1979 only one city (Omaha, Nebraska) had a no drop policy and by 1996, all but 
six cities had a no-drop policy.  See table 1 for a listing of the cities and the year in which 
they adopted a no-drop policy. 
In this paper we offer a rationale for adopting no-drop policies that is based on the 
tension between the victim’s intentions at different points in time.  Her preferences for 
prosecution and ending the battering relationship are strongest right after a battering 
incident. Over time, her preferences change such that she no longer wishes to prosecute 
and she has often reconciled with the abuser.  Hence, if at the time of the battering 
incident she knows that she will forgive her partner and drop charges in the future, she is 
less likely to report him at that time.  But if her power to drop charges in the future is 
removed (because of a no-drop policy), she may be more willing to report him.  In this 
way, the no-drop policy provides the victim with a commitment device to overcome the 
time inconsistency of her preferences.   13
Evidence from surveys of victims supports the idea of time inconsistency of 
preferences and the value of no-drop policies. Smith et al. (2001) presents the following 
comments by victims in cities with “no drop” policies: “The prosecutor did not listen to 
me when I recanted my story. They continued to prosecute. In the long run, I am so glad. 
He got punished.” Another woman states “If it hadn’t been for the laws of arresting and 
prosecuting, I would have been back with him. I am glad they stuck with it and enforced 
the laws.”  
To our knowledge, there is no scientific study of the effect of no-drop policies on 
the number of women who are battered, the seriousness of domestic violence assaults or 
the proportion of assaults that are reported.
11  However, there is evidence that this policy 
did represent a significant change in policy and led to an increase in prosecutions and 
convictions (Smith et al., 2001). 
  
5. The model 
In this section we present a simple model of domestic violence in which the woman 
displays changing preferences regarding the value of the relationship and is aware of this. 
The objective of this model is to show how providing a commitment device in the form 
of no-drop policies would affect both a man’s behavior and a woman’s response to it.    
The model provides one surprising result: implementation of no-drop policies leads to a 
reduction in the number of batterers who are murdered. The reason is that murder is an 
extreme form of a commitment device. When the government provides a cheaper one, 
                                                 
11 Perhaps the closest is that of Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld (2003) who incorporate no-drop policies 
among other prosecutorial and police policies to create an index of “exposure reduction.”  They find that 
too little exposure reduction may increase intimate partner homicide, while greater amounts can reduce it.    14
women who were willing to kill their partners to avoid returning to them, will now report 
them to the authorities instead. In addition the model shows that a no-drop policy results 
in an increase in reporting if the degree of time inconsistency is large enough and has an 
ambiguous effect on the amount of battering. 
The model without a “no-drop” policy is depicted in Figure 1. First the man chooses 
between battering (B) or not (NB). Battering gives him a utility of v. We assume that this 
utility is randomly distributed in the real numbers –with c.d.f. G(v). This assumption 
captures the fact that some men really enjoy battering while others dislike it. If no 
battering occurs the game ends and the players receive a normalized payoff of zero. If 
battering occurs, the woman has three options: kill her partner (K), do nothing (N), or 
report him to the authorities (R). If she kills him, he suffers a cost d for being dead,
12 and 
she faces the cost c of being prosecuted by the authorities and the loss m of the value she 
assigns to the relationship (this includes both the sentimental and economic value of the 
relationship). If she does nothing, the relationship continues. Since she has been battered 
her valuation of the relationship is diminished by the amount h. We assume that this 
utility is randomly distributed in the positive real numbers –with c.d.f. F(h). This 
assumption captures the fact that battering affects women’s valuation of the relationship 




                                                 
12 We do not assume the cost of being dead is infinite since some men may be willing to batter their wives 
even under the serious threat of being killed by them.    15
 
Figure 1: Game Tree 
 
We assume that reporting the battering partner to the authorities has a direct benefit 
(or cost) r to the woman. She benefits from reporting him to the authorities if the police 
scare him or remove him while he is still violent. Reporting him to the police may also 
have costs, resulting in a negative r.  He may get upset and violent or there may be stigma 
costs associated with police intervention. Therefore, the parameter r may be positive or 
negative depending on whether the direct benefits or costs of reporting prevail (we 
assume that –r<c, that the cost of killing him is greater than the cost of reporting him). 
If she reports him, the legal procedure starts and a new self of the woman (W2) 
decides in period two whether to drop charges (D) or not (ND).  Her new self (W2) has a 
different valuation of the relationship than the valuation of the previous self (W1). The 
payoffs of these two selves (W1 and W2) are written in the second and third place, 


















utility level from ND and continuing with the legal procedures, -m in addition to r.
13 The 
first self assigns a value of –h to dropping the charges and staying in the relationship, 
while the second self values it as if nothing had happened, 0. These payoffs are in 
addition to the direct benefit of reporting r. Note that the preferences between the 
woman’s selfs differs in h:  the larger h, the greater the degree of time inconsistency 
displayed by the woman.  
Finally, the man (whose payoff is indicated in the first place of the payoff vector) 
suffers a cost of s if the woman reports him and then drops the charges and suffers a cost 
of j if the woman does not drop the charges. This parameter represents the expected 
disutility of going to jail. 
We assume that the parameters c, d, j, m and s are positive. In addition, we assume 
that the worst punishment is death, followed by jail and then arrest when it is not 
followed by prosecution (d>j>s). 
  If a “no-drop” policy is in place the game is the same with the exception that the 
second self does not have the option of dropping the charges.  That is, once she reports 
him she is committed to prosecuting him.  
We study next how a “no-drop” policy would affect the behavior of the players. 
First, we provide a description of equilibrium behavior with and without such a policy. 
We follow this with a comparison of the two situations in terms of battering, and the 
woman’s response to it. 
 
                                                 
13 Remember that payoffs are normalized so as to have the utility if no battering occurs equal to zero.   17
5.1. Without a “no drop” policy: 
  The subgame perfect equilibrium can be solved easily by backwards induction. 
W2 always drops the charge since r-m is lower than r. Knowing this W1 must choose 
among kill (K), report (R) and do nothing (N). Her decision will depend on the disutility 
of remaining in a battering relationship (h) and whether reporting him has direct benefits 
or costs regardless of what she does later (r positive or negative). If r is positive, 
reporting him when she will drop the charges later is always better than doing nothing. 
Thus she compares K and R. She will choose to report him if r-h>-m-c, (the utility from 
reporting exceeds that of killing him).  Thus, the woman reports the batterer with 
probability F(r+m+c) and kills him with the complementary probability. If r is negative, 
reporting him when she will drop the charges later is always worse than doing nothing. 
Thus she compares K and N. She will choose to do nothing if -h>-m-c. Thus, the woman 
does nothing with probability F(m+c) and kills him with the complementary probability. 
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium response to battering for both positive and negative r and 
the corresponding vector of payoff for the players as a function of h.
14 
  The decision of the man will depend on his expectation of the woman’s response 
to battering. Given the distribution of men’s taste for domestic violence, we have that a 




                                                 
14 We do not duplicate the payoff of the two selves when they coincide.   18
5.2. With a “No-drop” policy: 
  The main difference between the case without a no-drop policy and with such a 
policy is under the latter, reporting is always better than killing.  This follows from the 
fact that W2 cannot drop the charges and reporting the man is less costly than killing him 
(–r<c). Thus she compares N and R. She will do nothing if –h>r-m. Thus, the woman 
does nothing with probability F(m-r) and reports him with the complementary 
probability. Note that the probability of reporting him is increasing in r and decreasing in 
m. Then, we have that a proportion 1-G((1-F(m-r))j) of men will choose to batter. 










5.3. The effects of the “no drop” policy: 
  From the comparison of the ranges of h that result in a battering man being killed 
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N (v, -h, 0) K (v-d, -m-c)  19
Proposition 1: A no-drop policy reduces the probability that a battering man is 
killed. 
  The intuition for this result is as follows. Without a “no-drop” policy the woman 
knows that she will drop the charges in the future, therefore reporting him to the 
authorities will not end the relationship. The only way she has to commit herself to 
ending the relationship is by killing him. She will do so if her valuation of her future life 
with the batterer (m-h) is low enough. If instead a “no drop” policy is in place, reporting 
him to the authorities serves as a commitment device since she will not be able to drop 
charges. 
  From Figure 2 we can also study the effect of the “no drop” policy on the 
reporting of battering.  
  Proposition 2: A no-drop policy increases the reporting if the degree of time 
inconsistency is large enough (h>m-r) but may have a negative effect otherwise. 
  If reporting a batterer to the police provides a short run cost to the woman but no 
benefit (r<0) the intuition is straight forward. The woman knows that withoug the policy 
she will drop the charges later and thus will not report him after the battering.  If instead 
she cannot drop the charges later she may be willing to report him as a way to commit 
herself to ending the relationship. Moreover, a no-drop policy may increase reporting  
since some women (those with an extremely high h) will decide to report the batterer 
instead of killing him. 
Contrary to what would be obtained under the assumption of stable preferences in 
this model, restricting the set of choices attached to reporting for a woman with unstable   20
preferences may actually increase the reporting of battering incidents. However, when the 
degree of time inconsistency is sufficiently low (h<m-r) and there are short run benefits 
of reporting (r>0) no-drop policies actually decrease reporting. In this case, women are 
willing to report battering to obtain the short run benefit but are not willing to commit to 
prosecution, hence, they would report without a “no drop” policy but not with such a 
policy in place. 
  Proposition 3: A no-drop policy has an ambiguous effect on the amount of 
battering. 
  The decision to batter depends on women’s response to battering. On the one 
hand, from proposition 1, we know that a “no drop” policy will result in a lower 
probability of the batterer being killed. Since this is the harshest punishment possible, a 
“no drop” policy can actually make battering more attractive. In addition, such a policy 
may result in fewer cases being reported if the degree of time inconsistency is small, 
which would also make battering more attractive. On the other hand, there are cases in 
which a “no drop” policy will increase the number of cases reported and prosecuted since 
charges cannot be dropped, and this would make battering less attractive. The total effect 
will depend on the relative strength of the different forces. 
While this simple model of domestic violence shows that the effect of no-drop 
policies on battering is theoretically ambiguous, its effect on the murder of batterers is 
not. When a woman displays time inconsistent preferences and exhibits some degree of 
sophistication regarding her inconsistency (eg, she can anticipate the inconsistency) she 
may be willing to commit herself to ending the relationship. If the government does not 
provide such a commitment option, she may prefer to kill her batterer rather than remain   21
in the violent relationship. Hence, a non-ambiguous result of the model is that “no drop” 
policies diminish the number of batterers murdered by their partners. 
Moreover, if preferences display a large enough degree of time inconsistency, the 
effect of no-drop policies on reporting is positive since women may start reporting 
knowing that they will not be able to drop charges in the future. 
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we estimate the impact of no-drop policies on intimate partner 
homicide, underlying violence against women and the reporting of battering.  We proceed 
in two stages. First, we estimate the impact of no-drop policies on intimate partner 
homicide using data on the 48 largest cities in the US for the period 1979-1996.  Second, 
we estimate the impact of no-drop policies on the number of women admitted to the 
hospital for an assault (an alternative and less extreme measure of domestic violence than 
homicide) and arrests for domestic violence (our measure of reporting) for the seven 
largest counties in California (because these data are not available for the 48 cities).      
 
6.1. The impact of no-drop policies on intimate partner homicide 
6.1.1. Data 
Our data for this part of the analysis includes information on prosecutorial and 
police policies regarding domestic violence (including the presence of no-drop policies), 
services for domestic violence victims and intimate partner homicides in 48 of the largest   22
US cities for the period 1979-1996.
15  For our analysis, two cities were dropped (New 
York City and Baltimore) because of ambiguity in the definition of the city and the 
resulting difficulty linking these cities with other data.
16  
Data on intentional homicides by intimate partners come from the FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) 1979-1996.  A homicide was 
considered an intimate partner homicide if the assailant was a husband (wife), ex-
husband (ex-wife), common law husband (common-law wife), or boyfriend (girlfriend). 
Homicide by an ex-boyfriend (ex-girlfriend) is not recorded.  The small number of 
intimate partner homicides in which the victim and assailant were of the same sex was 
dropped.  These data also do not contain unintentional or negligent killings – all 
homicides included here were intentional.  Intimate partner homicide figures were 
adjusted by the FBI for missing data on relationship assuming underreporting 
independent of sex, race and marital status of the victims.
17  We keep all homicides 
victims between the ages of 20 and 55 (the age group for which intimate homicide is 
most prevalent).  
Figures 3A and 3B display trends in intimate partner homicide for the 48 cities and 
the nation as a whole for the period 1979-1996.  As is evident from the graphs, the trends 
are similar for our sample and the nation as a whole suggesting that our results are likely 
generalizable.  While the annual number of female intimate partner homicides nationally 
has declined slightly from 1500 to 1250 over the nearly 20 year period, the number of 
                                                 
15The data on prosecutorial policies and services were collected by Laura Dugan, Daniel Nagin and Richard 
Rosenfeld for the National Institute of Justice and the National Consortium on Violence Research. See 
Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld (2000) and (2003).  
16 For example, New York City consists of five counties, each with a different prosecutor.   
17 This would result in an over-reporting of intimate homicide victims if stranger homicides are less likely 
to have missing data on relationship to the assailant.    23
men killed by wives has declined dramatically from 1400 to less than 500 annually. Other 
studies have shown that more than half of men killed by their partners had documented 
histories of battering.
18  If we interpret the number of women killed by intimates as a 
reflecting the amount of underlying domestic violence, then the fact that this number has 
remained relatively constant suggests that the decline in the number of men killed is not 
attributable to a decline in domestic violence. 
  
6.1.2. Results 
In Figure 4 we present the average number of men and women killed by intimates 
over this period in the years immediately before and after a no-drop policy was adopted 
(t=0 in the year the policy is adopted, t= -1 in the year before and t=1 in the year after).
19  
As is evident from the graph, there is a decline in the number of men killed by women in 
the years immediately after the adoption of a no-drop policy.  In contrast, the number of 
women killed by their partners appears, if anything, to increase with the adoption of no-
drop policies (though not significantly) and then decline. Prior to the adoption of the 
policy, there does not appear to be any downward trend in the intimate homicide rate 
suggesting that passage of the law does not simply reflect underlying trends.  
In Table 2A we present estimates of the impact of no-drop policies on male and 
female victims of intimate partner homicide controlling for other characteristics that 
could also affect intimate homicide rates.   We employ log-linear regressions as well as 
                                                 
18 A study conducted in Georgia of 226 female inmates imprisoned for having killed an intimate partner 
found that 90 percent of women claimed that the victim assaulted or abused her at the time of the crime and 
in more than 50 percent of the cases there was a record of a history of domestic abuse.  See Haley  (1992).   
19 Numbers represent the (weighted) average number of homicides per city for the 30 cities that passed a 
no-drop policy 1981-1994.   24
negative binomial regression models following Grogger (1990) which yield similar 
results.
20  All regressions include the log of the population age 20-55 (we do not constrain 
the coefficient to be equal to 1) and city and year fixed effects and are weighted by the 
population of the city.   
In column 1 of Table 2A we present results of a regression of the natural log of 
males killed by intimate partners on an indicator for whether a no-drop policy was in 
place in that year controlling for city and year fixed effects as well as the natural log of 
the population of men age 20-55, the share black, and the rate of non-intimate homicides.  
The estimate of the impact of no-drop policy of -.188 is statistically significant.  In 
contrast, in column 2 we find that no drop policies have a positive (0.117) but 
insignificant impact on homicide of females by intimate partners.   In columns 3-8, we 
present the results of regressions that include additional controls: average area wages, the 
employment to population ratio, AFDC benefits for a family of four in the state, services 
for domestic violence victims, and the lag of the number of women killed by their 
partners as a control for changes in underlying domestic violence.
21  As is evident from 
the table, inclusion of these additional controls does not significantly alter the negative 
and significant relationship between no-drop policies and the number of men killed by 
intimates.
 22  In the second panel of the table are results of the negative binomial 
                                                 
20 Poisson models were rejected due to over-dispersion  (the variance exceeded the mean in these data).  
When there is over-dispersion, Poisson estimates are inefficient with standard errors biased downward. The 
negative binomial distribution can be thought of as a Poisson distribution with unobserved heterogeneity 
which, in turn, can be conceptualized as a mixture of two probability distributions, Poisson and Gamma. 
21 With the exception of population counts and share black in the city, data for the above controls are 
collected annually and thus are not merely linear interpolations between census years.  This is important as 
we are identifying the impact of no-drop policies off a non-linear change in policy.   
22 As a “falsification” check, we also estimate the impact of no-drop policies on non-intimate partner 
homicide.  When we do, the point estimate from a log-linear regression is -0.061 and it is imprecisely 
estimated with a standard error of 0.046.   25
specification in which the outcomes are the number of male and female intimate partner 
homicides.
23  The results are very similar to those from the log linear regressions.   
We also estimate the impact of no drop policies on intimate partner homicide 
stratified by age of the victim.  We argue that if no-drop policies are decreasing male 
homicides because of substitution of commitment devices, then we should find greater 
effects among those in longer relationships which would allow women time to learn of 
their difficulty committing.  While we lack information on relationship tenure, we do 
have information on the age of the victim which serves as a very crude proxy for 
relationship length: younger victims are more likely to be in shorter relationships relative 
to older victims.  
In Table 2B we present the results of a log-linear specification stratified by age of 
the victim.  We define as old, victims age 35-54 and as young, victims age 20-34.  As is 
evident from the table, we find that the impact of no drop policies on intimate partner 
homicide is limited (and considerably stronger) for older victims, consistent with the 
notion that women need time to learn of their difficulty to commit to leaving without any 
commitment device. 
 
6.1.3 Robustness  
                                                 
23 Hausman, Hall and Grilliches (1984) propose a conditional negative binomial model for panel data.  
However, Allison and Waterman (2002) argue that this model is not a true fixed effect method because 
conditioning on the total count for each city does NOT eliminate the intercept from the likelihood function.  
Rather, Allison and Waterman argue and provide simulation results that suggest that an unconditional 
negative binomial regression that includes dummy variables for the city fixed effects yields unbiased 
estimates.  The unconditional negative binomial regression results with dummy variables for the fixed 
effects that are presented in Table 2A are similar to the log linear results and the conditional negative 
binomial model (xtnbreg in STATA) are considerably smaller (roughly half the size of the unconditional 
estimates) but significantly different from zero.     26
When we employ a log-linear model, we necessarily exclude from the analysis any 
observation in which there are no intimate partner homicides.  These tend to be smaller 
cities which receive small weights in the weighted regressions.  To check whether our 
results are driven largely by these excluded observations, in Table 2C we present results 
in which we add 1 to the dependent variable so that the observations previously dropped 
are now included (and equal to zero).  We do this for the subsample of older victims as 
there are more dropped zeros than for the general sample.  The results are similar, though 
smaller.   
It may be the case that the adoption of no-drop policies coincides with the adoption 
of other policies that address domestic violence, in which case our estimates of the 
impact of no-drop policies on intimate partner homicide may suffer from omitted variable 
bias.  To address this issue, in Table 3 we present estimates of the impact of no-drop 
policies on intimate partner homicide controlling for additional domestic violence 
policies.  These policies include: whether the police have a separate domestic violence 
unit, whether there is a “pro-arrest” police for violation of a protection order and whether 
the city has what is referred to as a “mandatory arrest policy” which states that when an 
officer suspects domestic violence, he must arrest the offender.   In the first two columns 
of Table 3 are estimates based on the entire sample and in columns five and six the 
estimates are based only on older victims. As is evident from the table, the addition of 
these controls does not appear to have any effect on the impact of no-drop policies on 
intimate partner homicides.  This also provides evidence that the reduction in male 
homicides as a result of no-drop policies does not merely reflect a shift or change in the 
seriousness with which the authorities take issues of domestic violence.  If it did, the   27
other policies would have a similar effect.  Finally, we include controls for male and 
female labor force participation, earnings and education in columns three and four and 
seven and eight.  In contrast to most of the other controls, these are not collected annually 
but are intercensal linear interpolations. The results are very similar.  
To assess the extent to which the results may be driven by one city, we estimate 48 
separate log linear regressions dropping one city from each.  We present the resulting 
distribution of estimates of the coefficient on no-drop policies in Table 4A.  The median 
estimate is -0.213 with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-.217, -.208].  We therefore 
conclude that it is not the case that the results are driven by one city. 
An additional concern is that the estimates of the effect of no-drop policies may be 
capturing downward trends in homicides which are not controlled by year fixed effects.  
As an additional check to assess whether this may be driving our results, we randomly 
generate no-drop policies and estimate the impact of these randomly generated laws on 
male and female intimate partner homicide. We repeat this exercise 1000 times.  The 
results are presented in Table 4B.  As is evident from the results, the randomly generated 
no drop policy has no significant impact on either the number of men or women killed by 
intimates which suggests that the significant results that we obtain are not driven by 
downward trends in homicides unrelated to the adoption of no-drop policies.    
The data support the prediction of our model that the number of batterers who are 
murdered unambiguously declines with the adoption of no-drop policies.  Our findings 
with respect to females are inconclusive (consistent with our model that provides no 
prediction with respect to the effect of no-drop policies on domestic violence).  Not only 
are the effects insignificant, but they refer only to extreme acts of violence. Thus, to   28
empirically assess the extent to which no-drop policies affect underlying domestic 
violence and reporting, we turn to a subset of the data for seven counties in California for 




6.2. Impact of no-drop policies on underlying violence and reporting 
6.2.1. Data 
For our analysis of the impact of no drop policies on underlying domestic violence 
and reporting, we focus on the seven largest counties in California, representing 63 
percent of the state, for which we have information on the presence of no-drop policies as 
well as the number of men arrested for domestic violence (our measure of reporting) and 
the number of women admitted to the hospital as a result of an assault (our measure of 
underlying violence).
 24  These data are available by race, county and year for the period 
1990-2000.
25   
Our measures of reporting and underlying violence are proxies. Data on actual 
reports by the victims are not available – though evidence suggests that over the period of 
the 1990s as more cities adopted no-drop policies, the share of victims reporting the 
                                                 
24 The seven counties are: Alameda, Fresno, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco and Santa 
Clara.  Together they represent 19 million individuals or 63 percent of the population of California.  In all 
but Los Angeles and San Diego counties, there is only one prosecutor for the entire county so that the 
presence (or absence) of a no-drop policy applies to all residents in the county (not just those in the largest 
city).   In Los Angeles and San Diego counties, the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego have a separate 
prosecutor and the information we have on the presence of no-drop policy refers to the city prosecutor, 
(although it is important to note that 40 percent of the population in Los Angeles and San Diego counties 
live in Los Angeles and San Diego city, respectively). We consider the measurement error introduced by 
this in the analyses.    
25 The data on arrests for domestic violence were collected by William Wells and Willian DeLeon-
Granados for the California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center.  The data on 
admissions to the hospital for an assault were calculated by the authors from the California hospital 
discharge database.    29
victimization to the police increased from 48 to 56 percent (Greenfeld et al, 1998).  Nor 
do we have measures of the incidence of domestic violence.  Instead, we use the number 
of women admitted to the hospital for an assault as a proxy for underlying violence, 
eventhough it is an imprecise measure for two reasons. First, it includes all women 
admitted to the hospital for assault and therefore includes those assaulted by non-
intimates.  Second, it includes only those for whom the injuries were serious enough to 
warrant hospital admission and excludes all women who were assaulted but did not seek 
medical attention.  We do believe, however, that it is a useful measure for three reasons: 
1) it is the only local-area measure of violence available (and it is available by race and 
year); 2) it is devoid of any reporting bias as it does not depend on women admitting that 
they were battered by their partners and 3) since a high proportion of women (76-87 
percent) who are assaulted are assaulted by an intimate, most hospital admissions for 
assault will likely have been caused by an intimate.
26   
  To identify the impact of no-drop policies on domestic violence against women 
and reporting, we use variation across the seven different counties in California for the 
period 1990-2000.  Four of the counties had a no-drop policy in place by 1990.  Three of 
the counties adopted a no-drop policy during the study period (Santa Clara adopted in 
1991 and Alameda and Fresno each adopted in 1994).  Our estimate of the impact of no-
drop policies on violence and reporting is therefore a difference-in-differences estimate 
comparing the difference (before and after) in outcomes for the those counties that adopt 
                                                 
26 Estimates from the NVAWS suggest 76 percent while evidence from a medical chart review of pregnant 
women admitted to the hospital for assault and presented by Goodwin and Breen (1990), suggests 87 
percent. 
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a no-drop policy with the difference in outcomes over the same period for those counties 
that observed no change in their no-drop policy.   
 
6.2.2. Results 
In Table 5 we present regression estimates of the impact of no-drop policy on 
violence against women from log-linear regression models (columns 1-2) and negative 
binomial models (columns 6-7) that include many controls.  For all regressions in this 
table, county fixed effects and quadratic time trends are included as well as time-varying 
county specific controls for differences in population growth, per capita income, the 
employment to population ratio, non-intimate homicide and the number of shelters 
available for victims of domestic violence.   We find no significant impact of no-drop 
policies on violence as measured by the log of the number of women admitted to the 
hospital as a result of assaults (column 1). As a “falsification check” we also estimate the 
effect of no-drop policies on hospitalization for car crashes and, as expected, we find no 
effect (column 2).  We find similar results with the negative binomial regressions.  
Having established that no-drop policies do not appear to have any impact on underlying 
violence, we turn to estimating their impact on reporting.    
In Figure 5 we present a measure of reporting domestic violence (the number of 
men arrested for domestic violence ) in the years immediately before and after a no-drop 
policy was adopted (t=0 in the year the policy is adopted, t= -1 in the year before and t=1 
in the year after).  As is evident from the graph, there is a large increase in this ratio in the 
years immediately after the adoption of a no-drop policy.  Prior to the adoption of the   31
policy, there does not appear to be much change in reporting, suggesting that the passage 
of the law does not simply reflect underlying trends.   
To control for any other changes that might have been coincident with the adoption 
of no-drop policies and could influence arrest rates, we turn to regression analysis.  In 
column 3 of Table 5 we examine the impact of no-drop policies on reporting as measured 
by the natural log of the number of arrests including all controls mentioned above.  We 
find that counties that adopt a no-drop policy witness a 14-17 percent higher rate of arrest 
for domestic violence relative to counties that do not adopt such a policy over this period.   
However it is not clear from this analysis if this finding is due to an increase in reporting, 
or an increase in domestic violence as a result of no-drop policies, (though the evidence 
suggests that domestic violence did not increase with the adoption of no-drop policies).  
Thus in columns 4 we estimate the impact of no-drop policies on arrests controlling for 
violence against women (as measured by female assaults).  We find that no-drop policies 
still increase arrests by 14 percent.   Finally, we attempt to control for police policies that 
might be correlated with no-drop policies and arrest rates. However, unlike prosecutor 
offices which tend to be county-wide, police departments are more local in nature and as 
such their policies with respect to domestic violence also vary at a more local level than 
the county.  We only have information on the police policies of the largest city in each 
county, but we include an indicator for whether that city had a mandatory arrest policy in 
place in column 5.
27  When we do, we find that mandatory arrests have a very small and 
insignificant negative effect on arrests for domestic violence and do not alter the impact 
                                                 
27 Oakland and Fresno adopted mandatory arrest in 1993, LA and San Diego had such a policy in place in 
1990 (the beginning of our sample), San Francisco never adopted one, San Jose adopted in 1994 and 
Sacramento in 1996.    32
of no-drop policies on outcomes. We find similar results with the negative binomial 
regressions.  
As noted previously, two of the seven counties (LA and San Diego) have more than 
one prosecutor’s office and our measure of no-drop policies refers to the largest city in 
each county, introducing considerable measurement error if another city within either 
county should change its no-drop policies during this period.  This did in fact happen in 
Los Angeles.  Within Los Angeles County, LA City (the largest municipality in LA 
County) adopted a no-drop policy in 1986 (before the start of our sample) but Long 
Beach City, which is a much smaller part of Los Angeles County, adopted in 1991.
28   
Since statistics on arrests for domestic violence are not available separately for LA City 
and Long Beach, by including LA County in our regressions, we are introducing 
measurement error.  To address this we exclude LA County from the sample and present 
the results in the second panel of Table 5.  Our estimates of the impact of no-drop 
policies on arrests increase considerably (likely as a consequence of the reduction in 
measurement error) but do not change for assaults.  In the third panel of Table 5 we 
exclude both LA county and San Diego counties, although we have no evidence that any 
other city in San Diego county changed its no-drop policy during this period.  The results 
are similar to previous estimates.  
 
7. Conclusions 
   Motivated by the cyclicality of violent relationships we present a theory of 
domestic violence that incorporates time inconsistent preferences. Our theory predicts 
                                                 
28 As of 2000, 9.5 million reside in LA County of which 461,000 reside in Long Beach and 3.7 million in 
LA City.    33
that the adoption of no-drop policies would result in an increase in the reporting of 
battering to the authorities and, more surprisingly, a decrease in the murder of violent 
partners. The reason for the latter is that no-drop policies provide to women in battering 
relationships a cheaper commitment to end the relationship than murder. 
Consistent with our theory we provide evidence that the adoption of no-drop 
policies in the US have resulted in a reduction of male homicides by intimates and an 
increase in reporting of battering. Unfortunately, we find that no-drop policies have had 
no effect on the prevalence of domestic violence as measured by female hospitalizations 
for assault, although this measure is far from perfect.  
Our results underscore the importance of considering the value of commitments 
when evaluating policies. In particular, we provide evidence that agents may substitute a 
cheaper public commitment device when one is offered for a more expensive private one.    
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Table 4B: Rand 1994 951,270














New Orleans 1996 484,674
New York 1990 8,008,278
Oakland 1994 399,484







San Antonio 1990 1,144,646
San Diego 1984 1,223,400
San Francisco 1989 776,733










Percent of total 15.6%Table 2A: Impact of No-Drop Policies on Intimate Homicides
Log-Linear Regression
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
No-drop policy -0.188 0.116 -0.167 0.144 -0.176 0.137 -0.193 0.117
[0.103] [0.084] [0.096] [0.094] [0.097] [0.095] [0.091] [0.091]
Ln(population) 1.943 1.057 1.904 0.876 1.923 0.897 1.956 0.557
[0.385] [0.376] [0.387] [0.378] [0.391] [0.383] [0.437] [0.416]
Control for share black & non-intimate homicide YYYYYYYY
Control for county wages, employment:population & AFDC benefits YYYYYY
Control for services YYYY
Control for ln(lag women killed) YY
Observations 689 760 689 760 689 760 649 718
R-squared 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78
Negative Binomial Regression Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
No-drop policy -0.174 0.113 -0.169 0.136 -0.146 0.133 -0.167 0.102
[0.082] [0.072] [0.082] [0.073] [0.084] [0.072] [0.086] [0.072]
Ln(population) 1.61 0.432 1.6 0.271 1.599 0.27 1.962 0.177
[0.394] [0.367] [0.398] [0.365] [0.393] [0.365] [0.403] [0.394]
Control for share black & non-intimate homicide YYYYYYYY
Control for county wages, employment:population & AFDC benefits YYYYYY
Control for services YYYY
Control for ln(lag women killed) YY
Observations 810 810 794 794 794 794 749 749
Interpretation -16.0% 12.0% -15.5% 14.6% -13.6% 14.2% -15.4% 10.7%
City and year fixed effects included in all regressions
robust standard error in bracketsTable 2B: Impact of No-Drop Policies on Intimate Homicides Stratified by Age of the Victim,  Log-Linear Specification 
Older Victims (35-55)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
No-drop policy -0.252 0.145 -0.248 0.156 -0.255 0.151 -0.29 0.138 -0.261 0.157
[0.110] [0.091] [0.110] [0.091] [0.111] [0.089] [0.121] [0.104] [0.111] [0.090]
Ln(population) 1.788 1.052 1.706 0.908 1.719 0.922 1.786 0.655 1.984 0.91
[0.334] [0.313] [0.346] [0.326] [0.348] [0.327] [0.435] [0.439] [0.375] [0.378]
Control for share black & non-intimate homicide YYYYYYYYYY
Control for county wages, employment:population & AFDC benefits YYYYYYYY
Control for services YYYYYY
Control for ln(lag women killed) YY
Control for ln (lag women killed by partners +1) YY
Observations 634 708 634 708 634 708 468 524 595 674
R-squared 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.7
Younger Victims (20-34)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
No-drop policy 0.097 0.047 0.099 0.06 0.086 0.054 0.039 0.067 0.05 0.063
[0.104] [0.073] [0.103] [0.073] [0.099] [0.074] [0.106] [0.080] [0.099] [0.074]
Ln(population) 0.71 1.391 0.685 1.277 0.704 1.276 0.919 1.314 0.806 1.195
[0.350] [0.313] [0.361] [0.314] [0.363] [0.313] [0.454] [0.355] [0.402] [0.336]
Control for share black & non-intimate homicide YYYYYYYYY
Control for county wages, employment:population & AFDC benefits YYYYYYYY
Control for services YYYYYY
Control for ln(lag women killed) YY
Control for ln (lag women killed by partners +1) YY
Observations 636 805 636 805 636 805 529 669 600 766
R-squared 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.75
Robust standard errors in bracketsTable 2C: Impact of No-Drop Policies on Intimate Homicides Among Older Couples (age 35-54) Log-Linear Specification Adding 1 to the Dependent Variable
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
No-drop policy -0.197 0.099 -0.192 0.105 -0.186 0.105 -0.19 0.111 -0.269 0.074 -0.19 0.112
[0.085] [0.073] [0.084] [0.073] [0.083] [0.073] [0.084] [0.073] [0.093] [0.085] [0.084] [0.073]
Ln(population) 1.337 1.086 1.273 1.006 1.259 1.005 1.515 0.902 1.547 0.65 1.534 0.881
[0.238] [0.234] [0.244] [0.245] [0.245] [0.247] [0.265] [0.274] [0.316] [0.320] [0.266] [0.280]
Control for share black and non-intimate homicide rate YYYYYYYYYYYY
Control for county wages & employment:population YYYYYYYYYY
Control for services (hotlines/shelters) YYYYYYYY
Control for lag women killed by partners YY
Control for ln (lag women killed by partners) YY
Control for ln (lag women killed by partners +1) YY
Observations 941 941 941 941 941 941 895 895 667 667 895 895
R- Squared 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.7 0.72 0.7 0.72 0.7
Robust standard errors in bracketsTable 3: Impact of No-Drop Policies on Intimate Homicides Controlling for Other Domestic Violence Policies
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
No-drop policy -0.201 0.098 -0.16 0.099 -0.254 0.1 -0.199 0.158
[0.101] [0.093] [0.083] [0.099] [0.111] [0.093] [0.115] [0.096]
ln (population) 2.319 1.105 2.133 1.01 2.835 1.456 2.377 1.256
[0.537] [0.591] [0.518] [0.665] [0.557] [0.525] [0.785] [0.732]
Share population black -0.007 -0.008 -0.028 -0.028 -0.022 -0.011 -0.034 -0.019
[0.043] [0.018] [0.032] [0.016] [0.015] [0.014] [0.019] [0.019]
Adult non-intimate homicides per 10000 0.254 0.226 0.249 0.217 0.186 0.147 0.172 0.14
[0.175] [0.124] [0.179] [0.136] [0.065] [0.065] [0.068] [0.067]
Average wage in county -0.007 -0.03 -0.003 -0.018 0.007 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015
[0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.022] [0.014] [0.014] [0.026] [0.026]
Employment:population in county 0.984 -0.024 0.068 -0.173 0.53 -0.575 -0.447 -1.208
[1.005] [0.781] [0.998] [0.879] [0.550] [0.565] [0.599] [0.608]
AFDC benefits (family of 4) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ln(dv hotlines) -0.032 -0.038 -0.032 -0.035 -0.044 -0.11 -0.084 -0.137
[0.053] [0.053] [0.042] [0.044] [0.040] [0.035] [0.060] [0.063]
Lag women killed by partners 0.007 0.006 0.06 0.04 -0.003 -0.003 -0.047 0.003
[0.005] [0.004] [0.052] [0.037] [0.012] [0.013] [0.049] [0.048]
Police pro-arrest policy for PO violation -0.129 0.016 -0.114 0.01 -0.298 0.143 -0.305 0.127
[0.108] [0.118] [0.079] [0.141] [0.100] [0.112] [0.104] [0.115]
Police mandatory arrest for dv 0.024 -0.016 0.066 0.022 -0.089 -0.09 -0.015 -0.075
[0.111] [0.121] [0.095] [0.142] [0.110] [0.110] [0.113] [0.115]
Police domestic violence unit -0.105 -0.112 -0.13 -0.108 -0.361 -0.287 -0.411 -0.242
[0.113] [0.086] [0.124] [0.080] [0.126] [0.120] [0.125] [0.122]
Female labor force participation 6.792 5.17 0.105 0.036
[4.480] [5.219] [0.051] [0.043]
Male labor force participation -10.106 -5.001 -0.011 0.038
[5.272] [4.348] [0.093] [0.085]
Male median earnings 0.053 0.055 7.876 9.268
[0.051] [0.051] [4.823] [4.426]
Female median earnings -0.119 -0.103 -11.732 -6.434
[0.091] [0.092] [4.387] [4.481]
% of men 25 + with at least 4 yrs college -0.027 -0.048 0.037 0.048
[0.028] [0.051] [0.036] [0.036]
% of females 25 + with at least 4 yrs college 0.181 0.078 0.098 -0.027
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048]
Observations 633 701 633 701 502 573 502 573
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.75 0.71
Robust standard errors in brackets
City and year fixed effects included in all regressions







95 % CI [-0.193, -0.183]





Standard Deviation 0.071 0.061
95 % CI [-0.0025,  0.0020] [-0.0017,  0.0023]Table 5: Impact of No-Drop Policies on Violence Against Women and Arrests for Domestic Violence
Arrests for Arrests for Arrests for
All Counties Ln(female assaults) Ln(car crashes) Ln(arrests) Ln(arrests) Ln(arrests) Female assaults Car crashes Domestic Violence Domestic Violence Domestic Violence
No-drop policy -0.034 0.002 0.139 0.143 0.168 -0.002 -0.045 0.163 0.104 0.132
[0.090] [0.043] [0.063] [0.063] [0.061] [0.02] [0.90] [0.052] [0.051] [0.065]
Per capita income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [4.10] [2.26] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Employment:population 2.853 1.714 2.253 1.935 2.225 3.328 4.584 -1.042 -3.712 -3.553
[1.545] [0.901] [1.194] [1.170] [1.364] [3.48] [4.91] [1.096] [0.999] [0.970]
Non-Intimate Homicide Rate 0.008 0 0.001 0 0 0.024 0.017 0.019 0.002 0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [7.63] [7.52] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Female population 00 0 0 0
[14.63] [15.87] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Shelters for victims of DV -0.044 -0.001 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 -0.036 0.039 -0.045 0.009 0.005
[0.031] [0.021] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [1.39] [1.93] [0.027] [0.031] [0.031]
White -1.775 -0.284 -1.639 -1.433 -1.428 -0.208 1.268 0.103 -0.114 -0.106
[0.117] [0.074] [0.107] [0.177] [0.178] [0.99] [7.65] [0.167] [0.136] [0.136]
Hispanic -1.507
[0.104] [0.059] [0.106] [0.178] [0.178] [3.19] [3.43] [0.124] [0.105] [0.104]
Ln(female population) 1.102 1.048 1.143 1.015 1.015
[0.053] [0.028] [0.078] [0.138] [0.138]
Ln(female assaults) 0.116 0.113
[0.079] [0.079]
Female assaults 0.003 0.003
[0.000] [0.000]
Mandatory arrest policy -0.051 -0.054
[0.077] [0.068]
Observations 231 231 224 224 224 231 231 231 231 231
R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.92
Interpretation -0.2% -4.4% 17.7% 11.0% 14.1%
Arrests for Arrests for Arrests for
Without Los Angeles County Ln(female assaults) Ln(car crashes) Ln(arrests) Ln(arrests) Ln(arrests) Female assaults Car crashes Domestic Violence Domestic Violence Domestic Violence
No drop policy -0.1 0.036 0.148 0.157 0.198 -0.032 -0.041 0.22 0.135 0.15
[0.093] [0.041] [0.090] [0.088] [0.076] [0.39] [0.84] [3.33] [2.35] [0.061]
Per capita income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [3.68] [2.32] [0.59] [0.60] [0.000]
Employment:population 7.071 1.774 0.082 -0.559 0.159 4.457 6.294 -4.878 -5.714 -5.682
[2.403] [1.157] [2.189] [2.322] [2.414] [2.37] [8.97] [3.75] [5.06] [1.108]
Non-Intimate Homicide Rate 0.009 0 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.005 0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [9.18] [5.72] [4.44] [1.49] [0.003]
Female population 00 0 0 0
[9.73] [9.45] [4.08] [0.40] [0.000]
Shelters for victims of DV -0.043 0.133 -0.017 -0.013 -0.034 0.002 0.116 0.024 0.053 0.048
[0.052] [0.028] [0.047] [0.047] [0.052] [0.04] [2.55] [0.52] [1.28] [0.040]
White -2.056 -0.543 -1.671 -1.477 -1.466 -0.303 1.111 0.204 0.503 0.508
[0.170] [0.110] [0.171] [0.241] [0.239] [1.76] [8.28] [1.13] [3.00] [0.170]
Hispanic -1.689 -0.625 -0.989 -0.827 -0.822 -0.471 0.534 0.305 0.566 0.568
[0.112] [0.070] [0.115] [0.227] [0.226] [3.97] [6.13] [3.15] [6.18] [0.092]
Ln(female population) 1.226 1.182 1.129 1.012 1.01
[0.072] [0.045] [0.084] [0.185] [0.184]
Ln(female assaults) 0.095 0.092
[0.109] [0.109]
Female assaults 0.01 0.01
[6.25] [0.002]
Mandatory arrest policy -0.094 -0.027
[0.101] [0.061]
Observations 198 198 191 191 191 198 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.89 0.98 0.61 0.61 0.62
Robust standard errors in brackets
Interpretation -3.1% -4.0% 24.6% 14.5% 16.2%
Arrests for Arrests for Arrests for
Without LA or San Diego Ln(female assaults) Ln(car crashes) Ln(arrests) Ln(arrests) Ln(arrests) Female assaults Car crashes Domestic Violence Domestic Violence Domestic Violence
No drop policy -0.044 0.096 0.25 0.253 0.244 0.045 0.052 0.292 0.209 0.163
[0.109] [0.048] [0.076] [0.078] [0.073] [0.087] [0.042] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055]
Observations 165 165 158 158 158 165 165 165 165 165
R-squared 0.86 0.96 0.49 0.49 0.49
Robust standard errors in brackets
Interpretation 4.6% 5.3% 33.9% 23.2% 17.7%
County fixed effects and a quadratic time trend included in all regressions
Negative Binomial Regressions Log-Linear RegressionsFigure 3A: 
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Figure 4: Average number of homicides per city 
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